SIEM / SOC: detection and investigation
POST /v1/ingest/bulk. Sigma import is no longer part of core; native rules at /v1/rules stay. See SIEM/SOC migration.The problem
A SOC wants the alert, the events behind it, the access policy that applied to them and the investigator's pivots to live in one place, so that an alert can be traced to its source rows and the export can be checked later.
The shape
- Map and load (OpenETL). Each raw event becomes a row of the shape you chose and is sent to
POST /v1/ingest/bulk. - Gate (Relata).
PUT /v1/ingest/contracts/{dataset}installs a versioned data contract. Rows that violate it are quarantined with the reason and never block the valid rows.GET /v1/ingest/quarantineandGET /v1/ingest/contracts/{dataset}/qualityshow the quarantine and schema drift. - Detect. A window rule fires one alert per group per window. The supported semantics are
thresholdandcorrelationover tumbling event-time windows with a durable cursor; anything else is refused with400 unsupported-rule-semantics, never approximated.
curl -s -X POST "$RELATA/v1/rules?purpose=audit" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{
"name": "brute force", "target_type": "AuthEvent", "severity": "high",
"window": {"kind": "threshold", "event_type": "login_failed", "min_count": 3,
"window_ns": 300000000000, "allowed_lateness_ns": 60000000000,
"time_field": "ts", "group_field": "user", "event_type_field": "kind"}}'- Triage.
PATCH /v1/alerts/{id}moves an alert throughopen,acknowledged,resolvedandfalse_positive. A forbidden transition is409 invalid-alert-transition, and every accepted change is appended to the alert's status history with its actor. - Evidence.
GET /v1/alerts/{id}/evidencereturns the alert, the contributing events under the caller's read policy, the rule version and window, a completeness report and a SHA-256 over the events.GET /v1/alerts/{id}/timelineorders the same material. - Pivot and hunt.
POST /v1/alerts/{id}/pivotfollows one entity into the other records the caller may read. Host relationships are links (POST /v1/links) thatGET /v1/graph/traverseandGET /v1/graph/shortest-pathwalk. Rule tuning (snooze, suppression, exceptions) is durable. - React to changes.
GET /v1/changesis a resumable change feed (off unlessRELATA_CHANGE_FEED_ENABLEis set).
Governance is in the path: a principal without read access to the event type gets the alert but every event as not_authorized, and the export is marked partial.
Telemetry from your own services can arrive over OTLP at POST /v1/traces, POST /v1/logs and POST /v1/metrics (off unless enabled; see Observability).
Honest limits
- Writes are accepted, not yet durable by default. Loading rows with
X-Relata-Durability: syncwaits for stable storage; otherwise pollGET /v1/ingest/tasks/{id}. - Pivots are exact-equality lookups, not graph traversal.
- Evidence lists at most 1000 event ids per alert.
- Single node, local storage. Hard kill was tested; host power loss, failover and an external SIEM were not.
- The migration from an existing SIEM has been rehearsed only on a synthetic fixture. See SIEM/SOC migration.
Exercised by
Scenario V3-14 (brute force to alert, triage, evidence, pivot, graph hunt, kill -9 recovery) and V3-04/V3-05 (OTLP) in the relata-test 3.0 battery, run against a debug build of the integration branch on 2026-11-03. The SIEM run passed its defining assertions and recorded one defect: evidence.reproduce.sql omits the rule's event_type filter, so the reproduction query returns one extra row (the user's successful login) compared with the alert's evidence. Treat the SHA-256 export as the authoritative record and the reproduction query as a starting point until that is fixed.